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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

Readers will find much food for thought and a keen interest in a decision
made by United States District Judge Bodine, in the case American Can Com
pany; Missouri Can Company and Detroit Can Company, versus The United
States (published in the Bulletin of the American Institute of Accountants
issued July 15, 1927).
This case comprehends the question as to how far the commissioner may
exercise authority under the act of 1917 in directing how books of account shall
be kept, if the method in use does not, in his opinion, reflect income. One
should keep in mind that the ruling of the learned court appertained to the act
of 1917, and that section 213(d) of that act provided as follows:

“A corporation . . . keeping accounts upon any basis other than that of
actual receipts and disbursements, unless such other basis does not clearly
reflect its income, may, subject to regulations made by the commissioner
of internal revenue, with the approval of the secretary of the treasury,
make the return upon the basis upon which its accounts are kept, in which
case the tax shall be computed upon its income so returned.”

In the case at issue before the court, it appears that the taxpayers had made
their returns on the basis on which their books were kept, that this basis
was presumably the accrual basis, but that the commissioner did not accept the
returns so made in toto, but adjusted the taxpayers’ inventories in such a
manner as to increase on the accrual basis the taxable income. The taxpayers
paid the deficiency asserted by the commissioner and then promptly filed claims
for refund based on the theory that if the basis upon which these taxpayers
kept their accounts and made their returns was rejected by the commissioner,
the only alternative open to them was to compute their taxable income upon
the basis of receipts and disbursements.
Upon this latter basis their combined taxable income was greatly reduced,
as is revealed by a comparison of the income and profits taxes returned orig
inally by the taxpayers on the accrual basis, with the same taxes based on cash
receipts and disbursements. This comparison is as follows:

American Can Company....................
Missouri Can Company......................
Detroit Can Company........................

Original
Cash basis
returns
$3,266,499.86 $2,514,478.94
7,449.89
15,213.54
6,287.19
393.39
$3,288,000.59 $2,522,322.22

Here was a reduction of $765,678.37 which the commissioner was obliged to
accept because of the language of the statute. In addition to this, the treas
ury was obliged to refund additional taxes erroneously assessed and collected
aggregating $1,953,480.79—quite a tidy sum—all of which had to be paid back
to these taxpayers with interest to date of judgment, because the commis
sioner’s representatives were not satisfied with the valuation of the inventories

131

The Journal of Accountancy
and because the language of section 213(d) of the act of 1917 "does not ”, as
stated by the court,
“ impose a tax upon the basis upon which the commissioner shall direct
the books to be kept. The option is with the taxpayer to make the return
upon the basis upon which its accounts are kept. The commissioner may
reject the basis and levy the tax upon actual receipts and disbursements.
He cannot in part reject and in part confirm the taxpayer’s method of
bookkeeping. If he could the tax might very well be an arbitrary adjust
ment reflecting anything but income.”
As said before, this language is in the act of 1917, and between the time when
this act was adopted and the date when the act of 1918 became law congress
accumulated a fund of lore upon the subject of tax procedure and accounting
practice, and in the act of 1918 it is provided:

“ That net income shall be computed . . . in accordance with the method
of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books . . . , but if no
such method of accounting is employed, or if the method employed does
not clearly reflect income, the computation shall be made upon such basis
and in such manner as in the opinion of the commissioner does clearly
reflect the income.”

No hampering restrictions upon the commissioner in that language, and not
so much faith attributed to “the receipts and disbursements” basis.
There are numbers of our congressmen who would profit greatly by an inten
sive course of instruction in accountancy, if one is to judge their present state
of information upon the subject by the views they hold upon such matters as,
for example, taxing stock dividends. There seems to be no clearer way to dem
onstrate that a stock dividend does not imply a distribution of assets than to
show the bookkeeping entry necessary to give effect to such a transaction.
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS

The court has jurisdiction to alter, modify, or set aside, or disregard the com
missioner’s finding of the March 1, 1913, value of land without affirmatively
showing error or fraud in the commissioner’s determination. (Court of claims
of the U. S., John S. Kernachan v. The United States.)
A partner may not deduct in his 1917 return a proportionate part of the
partnership contributions to the American Institute of Accountants, either as a
business expense or as a contribution to a corporation organized and operated
exclusively for scientific and educational purposes. (Court of claims of the
U. S., Robert Montgomery v. The United States.)
Dividends declared and paid in 1918, the 1918 earnings of the corporation at
the time being in excess of all dividends declared and paid during 1918, are
subject to surtax in the hands of the stockholder recipient. (Court of claims
of the U. S., Robert Clark Ream v. The United States.)
Income received by an estate in 1919 which, by the terms of the will is per
manently set aside for residuary legatees, non-taxable charitable and religious
corporations, is deductible from gross income of the estate under section 219 (b)
of the 1918 act, although not paid to the residuary legatees nor credited upon
the books of the estate to them until 1923. (U. S. circuit court of appeals,
second circuit, Frank Bowers v. Executors of the Estate of Margaret Olivia
Sage.)
Goodwill is not subject to wear and tear and its loss through prohibition
legislation may not be claimed as a deduction for obsolescence under section
214 (a) (8) of the act of 1918. (U. S. district court, N. D. California, S. D.,
Landsberger v. McLaughlin, Collector.)
A transfer made without consideration in 1912 to the natural heirs of the
grantor, aged eighty-three, of more than two thirds of her entire estate, was
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held to be a transfer in contemplation of death under section 402 (c) of the act
of 1918. (U. S. district court, S. D. of N. D. California, Executors of Estate of
Christine F. Ringstorff v. McLaughlin, Collector.)
A corporation is liable for 2% of the tax on its bondholders when bonds
provide for payment of principal and interest “without deductions for taxes
which the company may be required to pay or retain therefrom by any govern
mental authority of the United States.” (U. S. district court, S. D. of New
York, Roanoke Water Works Company v. Charles W. Anderson, Collector.)
The amount of cash dividend declared in 1917, but never actually distributed,
by a close corporation which at the time did not have and never set aside funds
with which to pay it, was held to be invested, not borrowed, capital, even
though the books showed a debtor-creditor relationship between the stock
holders and the corporation and the payment of interest to some stockholders
on the dividends declared. (U. S. district court, S. D. of N. D. California,
Haas Bros. v. John L. Flynn, Collector.)
Amounts paid corporate officers by way of percentages of profits during
1916, 1917 and 1918, pursuant to an authorization in 1914, established by the
taxpayer as reasonable bona-fide salary payments, are deductible as salaries
paid for actual services rendered, in the absence of evidence by the government
that such money paid was not salary but a distribution of profits. (U. S. court
of claims, William S. Gray Company v. The United States.)
A taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for exhaustion of patent licence con
tracts, based on their March 1, 1913, value over their remaining life under the
1916 and 1917 acts. (U. S. court of claims, International Curtis Marine
Turbine Company v. United States.)
A building and loan association organized and operating as such under state
law is exempt under section 231 (4) act of 1918, and the provision of the 1921
act limiting the exception to such associations, “substantially all of the business
of which is confined to making loans to members ”, does not apply under pre
ceding acts. (U. S. court of claims, Cambridge Loan and Building Company v.
The United States.)
The seller of an undivided one-third interest in a business receiving nothing
for goodwill is entitled to deduct only one third the bonus paid for goodwill in
the preceding year when he acquired his partner’s interests in the business
(65% of the whole) in the absence of evidence of the March 1, 1913, value of
the remaining 35% of the goodwill. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, sixth
circuit, L. P. Brewer v. Robert Orr, Jr.)
A gift in remainder for charitable purposes which may never ripen into
possession is too remote, contingent and uncertain to be taken into account in
determining the value of the net estate under the act of 1918. (U. S. court of
claims, Executors of Estate of Dellora R. Gates v. The United States.)
Income received by a decedent within the taxable year from the beginning
thereof to date of death is subject to tax under act of 1918, and is returnable
by his executor or representative. (U. S. court of claims, Executors of Estate of
Augustus D. Julliard v. The United States.)
The New York inheritance tax is not deductible from the gross income of the
decedent under section 214 (a) (3) act of 1918. (U. S. court of claims, Executors
of Estate of Augustus D. Julliard v. The United States.)
Non-interest-bearing notes of the chief stockholders of a corporation in
excess of the salary, expenses and dividends to which they were entitled, were
held not to constitute invested capital. (U. S. district court, district of Con
necticut, P. Garvin, Inc., v. Robert O. Eaton, Collector.)
A bequest to an organization for the promotion of practical benevolence is
exempt from the estate tax under the 1921 act. (U. S. district court, district of
Connecticut, Executor of Estate of Mary E. Scranton v. Robert O. Eaton, Collector.)
The tax on corporations exercising the option in section 13 (d) of the act of
1917 of making its returns on the basis upon which the returns were kept must
be levied upon the cash receipts and disbursements basis upon rejection by the
commissioner of a return made on basis upon which the corporation accounts
were kept. (U. S. district court, district of New Jersey, American Can Com
pany; Missouri Can Company; Detroit Can Company v. United States.)
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Decedent’s gross estate should include, under the act of 1921, securities suffi
cient to yield the annuity, where the securities had been transferred over two
years prior to death by the decedent to the grantees who contemporaneously
(a) executed annuity notes payable to the grantor, during her life, and (b)
transferred to trustee, in pledge of their annuity notes, the securities received
from the decedent. (U. S. district court, W. D. Texas, Eugene Tips v. James
W. Bass.)
A taxpayer is not precluded from setting up a ground for refund in an action
to recover an estate tax different from that urged in the claim for refund, where
misled by the commissioner’s failure to specify completely deductions dis
allowed. (U. S. district court, district of Connecticut, Executor of Estate of
Mary E. Scranton v. Robert O. Eaton, Collector.)
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